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Abstract 
 
Telegram messenger, created by an exiled Russian entrepreneur Pavel Durov, brands itself as a non-mainstream and non-Western 
guarantor of privacy in messaging. This paper offers an in-depth analysis of the challenges faced by the platform in Iran, with 59.5% 
of the population using its services, and in Russia, where Telegram is popular among the urban dissent. Both governments demanded 
access to the platform’s encrypted content and, with Durov’s refusal, took measures to ban it. Relying on the concept of surveillant 
assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson 2000), this paper portrays how authoritarian states disrupt, block, and police platforms that do 
not comply with their intrusive surveillance. Additionally, we consider the tools and actors that make up internet control assemblages 
as well as the resistance assemblages that take shape in response to such control. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The cloud-based messaging platform Telegram was created in 2013 to protect its developer, Pavel Durov, 
from state surveillance in Russia. Durov, an entrepreneur whose successful Facebook-resembling 
VKontakte social network gave him the title “Russia’s Zuckerberg” (Hakim 2014), refused to hand user 
data to the authorities and, consequently, fell under severe surveillance. In response to these circumstances, 
Durov developed Telegram with an emphasis on encryption and privacy, integrating diverse communication 
capacities, such as groups with unlimited members, voice call, polls, and channels for broadcasting public 
messages to large audiences. Telegram quickly attracted users in Iran and Russia enticed by its ideology, 
outspoken commitment to internet privacy, and user data protection from third parties, namely the 
government, marketers, and advertisers (Telegram n.d.) Contrary to its rival platform, WhatsApp, Telegram 
has deliberately avoided the market-based rules of platform development, such as merging with bigger 
companies, and receives all of its funding from Durov himself. The platform functions through a 
complicated web of decentralized companies and, therefore, defies any state regulation. In this sense, 
Telegram simultaneously positions itself in opposition to the economic outlooks that dominate the global 
IT market and to the localized restrictions on data privacy. However, this position comes with a price tag, 
as Telegram was eventually banned in both Iran and Russia.  
 
Despite the extensive body of work on privacy, surveillance, and democracy in Western countries, only 
recently have these concepts received academic attention in the context of authoritarianism and 
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undemocratic governance. For instance, theories such as networked authoritarianism (MacKinnon 2011) 
investigate China’s encompassing surveillance policies as well as online activism in response to it and show 
how “an authoritarian regime embraces and adjusts to the inevitable changes brought by digital 
communications” in the context where “the single ruling party remains in control while a wide range of 
conversations about the country’s problems nonetheless occurs on websites and social-networking services” 
(33). Setting aside the particularities of the Chinese political system, this paper aims to contribute to the 
field of surveillance studies by demonstrating, through the example of Iran and Russia, how authoritarian 
states disrupt, block, and police platforms that do not comply with their intrusive surveillance. Additionally, 
we discuss the tools and actors that make up internet control assemblages, as well as the resistance 
assemblages that challenge platform surveillance and censorship.  
 
Focusing on the case of Telegram, this paper scrutinizes platform surveillance as a process with social, 
political, and economic aspects and ramifications. Using the concept of surveillant assemblage (Haggerty 
and Ericson 2000) we assess the state of internet governance and control in both countries. Thus, the paper 
discusses Iran’s preventive, interceptive, and reactive measures (Small Media 2018: 26) that are applied to 
repress internet use through a complicated and overlapping assemblage of official and semi-official 
organizations. We also analyze the online and offline actors of internet control in Russia and demonstrate 
how the strategic ownership of platforms, as well as the strategic legislation, are manipulated by the state 
to curb freedom of expression. Based on such assessments, this research provides an overview of the actors, 
methods, and tools that are instrumentalized against Telegram by the regimes of both countries; it also seeks 
to identify some parallels and divergences in platform surveillance and resistance.  
 
Internet Governance in Iran and Russia 
 
Technological development has transformed the methods, approaches, and actors in surveillance. The long 
praised Foucauldian panopticism fell short of explaining the fluidity and omnipresence of a surveillance 
that reduces individuals to pure information and imposes its gaze on “groups which were previously exempt 
from routine surveillance” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000: 606). This paper applies the concept of the 
surveillant assemblage to emphasize the heterogeneous nature of the objects that work together in order to 
make intrusive undemocratic surveillance possible. Through their attempts to surveil Telegram, both Iran 
and Russia instrumentalize a multitude of actors and techniques to establish governmental control over 
information and citizens. In addition to the state, which establishes the hegemonic narrative, a number of 
other agents, such as users, civil society, regional and international flows, technological advancements, 
things and code, fabricate other assemblages that interact, converge, and diverge from the surveillant 
assemblage.  
 
While the rhetoric justifying the ban of Telegram in Iran and Russia is not completely analogous, both 
governments strive for full control over traditional and social media channels. Iran accuses Telegram of 
spreading moral decadence and reiterates Russian indictments of Telegram’s facilitative role in terrorism 
by offering anonymity and data protection to its users. The autocratic states take measures to mute, limit, 
discourage, and otherwise eradicate narratives that challenge their stability. The following section spotlights 
the techniques and technologies within the surveillant assemblages of Iran and Russia. It also draws attention 
to the blurring lines between police and citizens, which questions the traditional theorization of state power 
and suggests new ways of looking at surveillance in undemocratic environments. 
 
Iran: Totalitarian Surveillance 
Listed as one of the 15 enemies of the internet (Reporters Without Borders 2016), Iran has a complex 
assemblage of overlapping governmental and non-governmental institutions that are mandated with the 
regulation of internet content and access. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) stands above any 
governmental body and works directly under the supervision of Iran’s Supreme Leader to set the general 
policies for internet access and content control. The Commission to Determine the Instances of Criminal 
Content shares seven members with the SCC and predominantly occupies itself with identifying “online 
content that violates public morals, contradicts Islam, threatens national security, criticizes public officials 
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or organizations, or promotes either cyber crimes or the use of circumvention tools” (Small Media 2018: 
20). While these two bodies enjoy an extra-legal status, governmental bodies, such as the Information and 
Communication Technology Ministry, play a solely executive role and lack any decision-making power. 
Additionally, the Iranian Cyber Police and Cyber Army are exclusively tasked with monitoring content 
posted on the internet as well as preventing and prosecuting cybercrimes. The Cyber Police (FATA), 
established in 2011, mainly covers cases of fraud, scams, and harassment. The Cyber Army, an 
“underground network of pro-regime cyber activists, hackers and bloggers…monitors the internet and 
launches cyber attacks on opposition and anti-Islamic websites” (Small Media 2018: 20). In this way, what 
is deemed to be undesirable content according to the regime’s ideology, is actively policed and, 
consequently, many websites, keywords, and social media platforms are blocked.2  
 
In addition to controlling content, access to the free internet is also hindered through technical means, such 
as keeping the bandwidth and the speed of internet intentionally low. Table 1 demonstrates Iran’s methods 
of internet censorship, divided by preventive, interceptive, and reactive methods (Small Media 2018: 26). 
Resistance to the above-mentioned surveillant assemblage has ranged from erasing digital footprints by 
using public internet cafes to extensive use of anti-proxy and VPN services. These resistance strategies are 
chiefly dependent on the contextual circumstances, governmental policies, and technological possibilities. 
This paper later discusses resistance strategies in the case of Telegram, and through its investigation it also 
demonstrates the dynamic nature and fluidity of the surveillant assemblage. 
 
 Table 1. Methods of Internet Censorship in Iran  
 
Preventative Methods Interceptive Methods Reactive Methods 
URL “blacklist”: When a user 
attempts to access blocked content, 
they are automatically redirected to 
a webpage managed by censors. 
 
DNS redirection: 
Telecommunications Infrastructure 
Company (TIC) is given a list of 
URLs, which it blocks prior to 
allocating bandwidth to ISPs.3 
 
Content-control software: 
Software used by TIC to  
automatically inspect, filter, and 
block sites. 
 
HTTP host and keyword filtering: 
URLs and headers containing 
specific text are automatically 
filtered by TIC. 
 
Broadband speed limitations: ICT 
Ministry forbids speeds faster than 
128kbps for home users. 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI): 
Technology used to monitor, track, 
and block internet traffic. 
 
MITM (man-in-the-middle): 
Method used to intercept online 
communications. 
 
Traffic Analysis: Analysis of sites 
that are being viewed most 
frequently. 
Respond to patterns in user 
behaviour: Traffic analysis and 
DPI surveillance informs the 
creation of updated blacklists 
and filtered keywords. 
 
Arrest of internet activists 
and developers: The state has 
arrested a number of cyber 
activists working against online 
censorship. 
 
Periodic blocking of SSL4: 
Websites with SSL security 
protocols are periodically 
blocked inside Iran, forcing 
users to use insecure websites 
instead. 
 
Connection throttling: At 
moments of political or social 
tension, connection speeds are 
throttled to limit online 
engagement. 
 (Small Media 2018: 26) 
 
 
                                                   
2 Any given URL can be checked in the website below to see if it is blocked in Iran or not. However, the results are 
not exactly accurate; for example, Facebook is indicated as “working” even though it has been blocked for many years. 
See: https://www.comparitech.com/privacy-security-tools/blockediniran/#   
3 Internet Service Provider. 
4 Secure Sockets Layer. 
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Russia: Strategic Surveillance 
Russia’s internet platform landscape can be described as a hybrid, with both domestic and foreign 
companies providing services. The most prominent domestic social network is Durov’s first creation 
VKontakte, established in 2006 as a Facebook prototype. In 2014, following state pressure that forced its 
founder into exile (Miller 2015), VKontakte was appropriated by the Kremlin-loyal Mail.ru Group Media 
Holding, which also owns other popular social media platforms.  
 
Unlike Iran, Russia has not engaged in systematic platform bans, though the country is experiencing “a trend 
towards the normalization of telecommunications, digital, and internet surveillance” (Lokot 2018: 338). For 
instance, amendments to the information law in 2012 allowed the state to “blacklist and force offline certain 
websites without a trial” (BBC News 2012). Furthermore, the so-called “Yarovaya law package” requires 
platforms to “record and store all communications and activities of all users, and make stored records 
available to authorized government bodies at their request” (ICNL 2016). Although global platforms5 
function side-by-side Russia’s domestic prototypes and alternatives, the 2011 to 2012 anti-government 
protests have sensitized the ruling regime to new media’s mobilization capacities. Consequently, strategic 
measures have been taken to bring such possibilities under control. These measures range from basic internet 
filtering to strategic ownership of domestic platforms. Furthermore, the ruling regime is after securing 
access to user data by forcing foreign platforms to comply with demands for privacy invasion imposed by 
means of strategic legislation. The law targets users, platforms, content, and data flows. At the threat of 
losing access to the market, platforms are forced to filter content and share data with the state. As such, 
Facebook demonstrated compliance with orders for the removal of undesired content (Meduza 2018), while 
Google evidently relocated some of its servers to data centers in Russia (Razumovskaya 2015). In the 
meantime, Russia’s legislators are proposing new measures for internet sovereignty in the country, which 
would allow Russia’s cyberspace “to continue functioning even if the country is cut off from foreign 
infrastructure” (Reuters 2019). 
 
In addition to strategic control over platforms, the state targets users and instrumentalizes citizens. In 2014, 
the State Duma [parliament] passed the so-called “blogger law” that required bloggers with a daily audience 
of 3,000 or more to register as mass media (BBC News 2014), consequently increasing bloggers’ 
“vulnerability to criminal prosecution” (Lokot 2018). Although the “blogger law” was abolished in 2017, 
“content generating users” are still obliged to follow other legal acts governing the gathering, processing 
and dissemination of information (RBC 2017). Targeting the base user of platforms, new initiatives were 
passed to encourage reporting on crime. The previously “rare and unregulated” (The Moscow Times 2018) 
practice of financially rewarding citizens for their contributions to crime solving was turned into an official 
plan by the Ministry of Interior, declaring failure to report a witnessed crime as an act of crime in itself. 
These measures further encourage snitching and convert ordinary citizens into elements within Russia’s 
surveillant assemblage. Turning users against users not only fades the apparent role of the state in censorship 
but also serves as a pre-emptive measure for deterring online mobilization.  
 
In addition to the legal approaches, online and offline actors are utilized within the Kremlin’s surveillant 
assemblage. Online actors include groups, such as pro-Kremlin bloggers and trolls, who spread counter-
dissent content. Additionally, kiberdruzhinas or Cyber Guards screen harmful content online and report it 
to the authorities (Safe Internet League n.d.). Offline actors include the Cossacks6 who are recruited to 
physically suppress activism and opposition. Police forces operate both on- and offline by surveilling vocal 
citizens “who are already known to the local Centre E [counter-extremism] police force, the local FSB 
(Federal Security Service) branch, or the local district attorney” (Soldatov in Meduza 2016). Considering 
such comprehensive and strict policies to control cyberspace, Telegram’s refusal to play by the Kremlin’s 
rules inevitably turned the platform into a bullseye. 
                                                   
5 With the exception of LinkedIn, which was blocked in 2016 (Roskomnadzor 2016). 
6 “[R]evival communities of Russians claiming Cossack heritage are increasingly making their mark as conservative 
shock troops, fighting alongside separatist forces in southeast Ukraine and embracing, and sometimes policing, a return 
to conservative values under President Vladimir Putin” (Roth 2016). 
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The Arrival of Telegram 
 
Conflicting with totalitarian and strategic surveillance systems, Telegram entered the scene with a promise 
of freedom, privacy, and resistance; virtues that are engraved in the platform’s design. Telegram’s promise 
of security and its user-friendly design in an environment of extreme censorship and surveillance in Iran 
created an audience of millions. An official polling agency announced in April 2018 that 59.5% of Iranians 
use Telegram (ISPA 2018a). Telegram itself announced in January 2018 (Telegram Region 2018) that the 
application has 40 million monthly and 25 million daily users in Iran, as well as 678 thousand channels in 
Persian, with two billion visits per day. From these channels, 38% are dedicated to entertainment, 10% to 
news, and 3% have economic objectives. The platform claimed that 60% of all internet traffic in Iran is 
spent on Telegram, and advertising revenues reach 100 million USD per year (Telegram Region 2018). 
These are almost unfathomable figures for one of the most closed internet governance systems in the world.  
 
Such extensive use of a messaging platform was first harshly responded to by reactive methods. Celebrities 
and public figures were exposed to the scrutiny of the strict Islamic government, in order to warn the public 
of the omnipresent state surveillance and the consequences of publishing what the state deemed undesirable. 
As the number of users grew, the government imposed harsher surveillance methods. In May 2016, the 
Iranian Supreme Council of Cyberspace announced a one-year deadline to all messaging networks to 
transfer their servers to the country (Isfandiari 2017). Telegram was mentioned nowhere in the ratification, 
but as the most popular platform, it was obvious that it was the target of the new law. Soon afterward, it was 
announced that Telegram servers were transferred to Iran. Durov reacted immediately, stressing that 
“Telegram servers will never ‘travel’ to countries with internet censorship” (Durov 2017). Although there 
were occasional collaborations between Iran and Telegram, the platform continued to refuse Iran’s 
interceptive methods of surveillance. Consequently, the situation escalated and resulted in a total ban on 
Telegram, in May 2018, based on allegedly private plaintiffs that were never disclosed in any court (BBC 
Persian 2018a). 
 
Telegram faced similar intimidations in Russia. Having developed the VKontakte social network in 2006, 
Durov was already a controversial figure because of his refusal to collaborate with state security forces. He 
fled the country, in 2014, as a result of “government pressure to release the data of Ukrainian protest leaders” 
(Hakim 2014). While in exile, Durov presented Telegram “for people craving privacy and security” (Hakim 
2014). The platform soon attracted the attention of the Russian urban dissent. In Moscow, 28% of 
smartphone owners use Telegram, while the most popular Telegram channels are those reporting on politics 
and delivering the news (Momri Institute 2018). Over the years, Telegram’s penetration in Russia has been 
steadily increasing; it jumped from 3 million users in September 2016 to 10 million users in September 
2017, with current total monthly users of approximately 10 to 13 million (Telegram Region 2018). Telegram 
remains among the top five most popular messengers in the country and, ironically, was used by Russia’s 
state agencies and representatives as a platform for communicating with citizens. After Durov’s refusal to 
grant encryption keys to the FSB, the Kremlin promised to move its communications to another 
“convenient” platform (Vesti 2017).7  
 
The danger of the encrypted messaging afforded by Telegram has continuously recurred as a theme in 
Russia’s mainstream media discourse. Telegram was, for instance, blamed for being a go-to platform for 
terrorists and drug dealers (Medvedev 2017; Lyadov 2017). After terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, Russia’s 
lawmakers appealed to the FSB with the request to block access to Telegram as it facilitated “the process of 
recruiting Russian citizens to ISIS” (Vesti 2015). The Iranian Judiciary also claimed that the ISIS terrorists 
who attacked the Iranian Parliament had used Telegram as their means of communication and accused the 
platform of facilitating “organised espionage” (Tasnim News 2017). In the case of Russia, Durov protested 
that such accusations are not made against non-Russian applications, like WhatsApp (Vasilchuk 2017). 
                                                   
7 The last post by the Kremlin.ru channel was made on March 7, 2018 (Accessed in November 2018). Russia’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs actively maintains its official Telegram channel.  
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Reaffirming the inability of the Russian surveillant assemblage to instigate full control and censorship, 
especially on a global level of interaction, such selective targeting of non-complying platforms serves the 
purpose of sending a warning signal to other players.  
 
Involuntary Farewells  
 
Following the ban, Durov urged Telegram’s Russian users not to delete or reboot the app and promised to 
introduce built-in systems to circumvent blocking (Durov 2018). The innovative anti-circumvention 
methods indeed followed shortly after and challenged the attempted ban by making access to other 
platforms, such as Google, Google Drive, and YouTube, problematic. As a result, businesses suffered 
economic damage estimated to be 2 billion USD (Novaya Gazeta 2018). Internet experts stated that the only 
way Roskomnadzor (The Federal Service for the Supervision of Communications, Information Technology 
and Mass Media) can block Telegram is by “unplugging all the internet in the country” (RBC 2018). As the 
antagonism grew between the state and Telegram, other instances of resistance arose. People launched a 
symbolic protest by flying paper airplanes resembling Telegram’s logo, in the streets of cities across Russia, 
to demonstrate their solidarity with the platform and their resentment of state censorship (MacFarquhar 
2018). Roskomnadzor reacted by implementing a 300 million USD deep packet inspection (DPI) system 
that infringe on people’s access to Telegram (Zakharov and Reiter 2018). Although usage of such intrusive 
surveillance technologies was denied, the federal regulator confirmed that some measures were taken for 
improvement of the control system (Tass 2018).  
 
Similar to the dynamics of control, resistance, attack and retreat in Russia, despite the heated debates on the 
official level of Telegram use in Iran, 79% of the users continued using the app with the help of VPN8 
services (ISPA 2018b). Consequently, the ICT Ministry ordered all ISPs to block VPN connections and 
called the usages of such circumvention tools an American plan “to topple the Islamic Republic” (IRNA 
2018). Furthermore, one of the well-known international VPN providers, Psiphon,9 reported that it was once 
“test” attacked before the ban of Telegram, followed by two more attacks after the ban (Akbarpour 2018). 
On an individual level, public security police sent text messages to Telegram channel directors, threatening 
them with legal prosecution (Ronaghi 2018). Reacting on a legal level, a group of independent lawyers sued 
the government for violating the constitutional rights to freedom of expression (Radio Farda 2018). None 
of these legal accusations, either by the judiciary or activists, ever received a court hearing.  
 
In addition to prohibitive strategies within its surveillant assemblage, the Iranian government tried active 
policies of channeling users to cyberspaces that fulfilled the desirable level of governmental surveillance. 
An internally designed messaging app called Soroush was expansively advertised on the state’s official TV 
channels. The app, developed by a company affiliated with Iran’s Broadcasting Organization which is the 
country’s exclusive radio and television broadcaster (Soltani 2018), was not the first of several platforms 
created to replace a popular Western alternative. Either as a result of sanctions against Iran or the 
government’s policies, YouTube, Google Play, iTunes store, and many others were previously replaced with 
local prototypes. In this case, the massive user pool of Telegram made the state’s proactive efforts even 
more rigorous. For instance, Soroush administrators created fake accounts by using citizens’ mobile phone 
numbers without their knowledge or consent (Ranjbar 2018). Using Telegram was eventually announced 
illegal, since access to the platform was impossible without the use of circumvention tools (BBC Persian 
2018b), which is prohibited by Iran’s 2009 Cyber Crime Law; this law criminalizes distribution, sale and 
guidance on the usage of circumvention tools (Islamic Republic of Iran Parliament 2008).  
 
Due to Iran’s rigid political system and lack of freedom of expression, the cyber community responded more 
actively and innovatively to the ban. An anonymous activist group introduced Telegram Digital Resistance 
                                                   
8 “A VPN, or virtual private network, is a secure tunnel between two or more devices. VPNs are used to protect private 
web traffic from snooping, interference, and censorship” (Expressvpn n.d.). 
9 “Psiphon Inc. is a company based in Toronto, producing open-source multi-platform software that helps over 3 
million people every week connect to content on the Internet” (Psiphon n.d.). 
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as a “customized version of Telegram integrating the circumvention tool Psiphon” (TelegramDR n.d.). 
Although the TelegramDR app was removed from app stores due to its violation of copyright, the idea of 
integrating Telegram into other applications attracted the attention of state-affiliated platform developers. 
Thus, Hotgram and Golden Telegram were developed by security forces (DW Persian 2018) with their 
servers located on Iranian soil (Farda News 2018). Both applications act as a mediatory or bridge between 
the host application and the original Telegram and, therefore, police the data flow with a free hand. 
Considering Telegram’s popularity, many less tech-savvy users joined the new applications, proving the 
incredible resilience of the Iranian surveillant assemblage in controlling platforms through subtle tactful 
approaches.  
 
The complicated dynamics between state actors, official and underground resistance trends, international 
limitations and corporations, in the case of Telegram, expand the West-centric concept of assemblage by 
showcasing a more dynamic mass of actors, methods, and technologies. Both states try to use Telegram as 
an exemplary threat to compel other platforms to comply with their privacy intrusive demands, or as the 
head of Iranian Supreme Council of Cyberspace has stated “Telegram’s destiny will await” them (Young 
Journalists’ Club 2018). Although there are continuous demands by both regimes to host social media 
servers on their domestic soil and to make data available to the state security apparatuses in order to force 
global platforms to confront the dilemma of losing the market in Iran and Russia or adapting to the states’ 
demands, Telegram’s ban revealed an Achilles’ heel in the authoritarian surveillant assemblage. Blocking 
one platform has impacts on the operations of other platforms. Complete replacement of foreign platforms 
with domestic alternatives or strategic ownership through a market monopoly would require enormous 
financial and technological resources. Furthermore, blocking makes citizens more technologically savvy as 
they adapt to the use of VPNs and proxies to circumvent state-imposed barriers. Telegram’s ban 
demonstrates a complex response to an intricate problem involving not only the surveillant assemblage but 
also users, experts, economic and political stakeholders, activists, and many other involved parties, forming 
a resistance assemblage against a surveillant assemblage. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through the case of Telegram, this paper discussed in detail how surveillant assemblages in Iran and Russia 
facilitate state control and limit access to information not sanctioned by the state. At the same time, this 
study demonstrated how, within their networked authoritarianism, Iran and Russia negotiate control of the 
established platforms and confront the emerging alternatives that are designed to defy such controlling 
measures. By demanding Telegram to localize its servers and grant them access to user data, both countries 
have tried to dominate the limits of technological advancement. They have relied on various actors within 
their surveillant assemblages to police the users and the content, such as the Cyber Police and Cyber Army 
in Iran, and loyal media, vigilant citizens and Roskomnadzor’s communication authority in Russia. While 
international giants like Google and Facebook seem to have found a common language with the Kremlin, 
platforms that refuse to domesticate their servers and to follow these regimes’ demands are deemed 
dangerously rogue. That being the case, both countries have banned Telegram, aiming for the complete 
eradication of a platform that has stubbornly stood outside their surveillance.  
 
As Telegram users in Iran and Russia began to acquire new skills and technological solutions to sustain their 
access to the platform, both regimes had to adapt and handle these challenges to maintain their autocratic 
control over new spaces of public interaction. When it comes to the complete ban of platforms, the ruling 
regime in Russia faces technological challenges, and is cautious not to take measures that would lead to 
mass protests. In the attempt to overcome these limitations, the new set of legislative measures designed to 
make Russia’s internet more “sovereign” is in the making (Reuters 2019). While facing similar 
technological limitations, Iran’s surveillant assemblage is aggressive and comprehensive in its ubiquitous 
surveillance and uncompromising control. It actively blocks content and platforms, and follows a Chinese 
model (MacKinnon 2011: 44) to replace international services with domestic alternatives. Despite such 
differences, the burning desire to collect citizens’ data and secure control over content through any possible 
means brings Iran and Russia closer together in their outlook. As authoritarian governments tighten their 
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grip on the free internet, platforms such as Telegram present new possibilities to think, act and post messages 
alternatively. In doing so, they bring about new challenges for autocratic regimes. Telegram was developed 
as an ideological resistance to ideological surveillance. The case of Telegram not only presents the ongoing 
clashes between non-democratic states and users who struggle to access free flows of information but also 
highlights important issues about platform independence, alternative commercial models of platform 
development, and the future of platform surveillance across various political contexts.  
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